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DOES FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION INCREASE
THE LIKELIHOOD OF A SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISIS?
EVIDENCE FROM THE PAST THREE DECADES AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.
Introduction
Over the past three decades, leading industrial nations and many developing countries
have liberalized their financial markets by (i) removing foreign exchange controls, (ii)
deregulating interest rates paid on bank deposits, (iii) expanding the powers of domestic financial
institutions, and (iv) creating greater opportunities for entry by foreign banks. Unquestionably,
the deregulation of domestic and global financial markets has produced major benefits, including
more efficient intermediation of financial resources, more rapid economic development and
faster growth in trade. However, banking crises have occurred with increasing frequency in
international markets since 1973, and many crises have taken place in countries that deregulated
their financial markets. This apparent linkage between deregulation and banking crises indicates
that financial liberalization may have a “dark side,” because it tends to produce a banking system
that is more vulnerable to systemic risk.
Several recent studies indicate that banking crises associated with deregulation occur in
seven general stages. First, financial liberalization broadens the lending powers and permissible
investments of banks, and deregulation also places greater competitive pressures on banks. As a
result, banks have incentives to increase their profits by expanding their lending commitments
and equity investments in the real estate and securities markets. Second, the expanded

availability of debt and equity financing produces an economic “boom.” Boom conditions are
fueled by positive feedback between rising asset values and the willingness of creditors and
investors to provide additional financing based on their belief that asset values will continue to
rise. Third, asset markets ultimately “overshoot” and reach levels that cannot be justified by
economic “fundamentals” (e.g., the cash flow produced by real estate projects and business
ventures). Fourth, the asset boom becomes a “bust” when investors and creditors (1) realize that
market prices for real estate and securities have diverged from economic fundamentals, and (2)
engage in a panicked rush to liquidate their investments and collect their loans.
Fifth, the asset bust creates adverse macroeconomic effects, because it (A) impairs the
liquidity and market value of assets held as investments or pledged as collateral for loans, and
(B) discourages investors and creditors from making new investments or extending additional
loans, thereby depressing economic activity and reducing the ability of borrowers to pay their
debts. Sixth, the continuing fall in asset values and rise in nonperforming loans inflict large
losses on many banks. Those losses impair the confidence of depositors and threaten a systemic
crisis in the banking sector. Seventh, to prevent such a crisis, governmental authorities spend
massive sums to protect depositors and recapitalize banks.
In sum, deregulated financial markets generally promote faster growth rates by providing
more extensive financing to consumers and business firms during economic expansions.
However, by encouraging a greater reliance on external funding, deregulation creates a higher
risk that consumers and firms will become overextended and insolvent if external funding
sources shut down during economic contractions. Thus, financial liberalization tends to amplify
the business cycle, and it therefore creates a difficult tradeoff between (1) the important policy
2

goal of creating better conditions for economic expansion and (2) the equally important
objective of minimizing the risk of a severe economic downturn.1
Part I of this article considers evidence that financial liberalization has increased the
likelihood of systemic banking crises since the early 1970's. Particular attention is given to the
Japanese banking crisis of the 1990's, the U.S. banking and thrift crisis of 1980-92, and the
potential threat to banks posed by the boom-and-bust cycle in U.S. securities markets during
1996-2002. Part II describes the expansion of bank involvement in the U.S. real estate and
securities markets during the 1920's, and the apparent links between the collapse of those
markets and the systemic banking crisis of the Great Depression. The concluding section offers
some general observations about the evidence presented in Parts I and II.
I.

Financial Liberalization and Banking Crises since the 1970's
A.

Banking Crises in International Markets

In the early 1970's, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates,
together with dramatic increases in energy prices, brought an end to the postwar period of
relative stability in global financial markets. By the late 1970's, advances in information
1

For discussion of lessons to be drawn from the apparent correlation between financial
liberalization and economic crises since the early 1970's, see, e.g., Ben Bernanke & Mark
Gertler, “Monetary Policy and Asset Price Volatility,” 84 Economic Review No. 4 (Fed. Res.
Bank of K.C., MO), 4th Qtr. 1999, at 17, 17-21; Claudio Borio & Philip Lowe, “Asset Prices,
Financial and Monetary Stability: Exploring the Nexus,” Bank for Int’l Settlements Working
Paper No. 114, July 2002 (available at <www.bis.org>); E.P. Davis, Debt, Financial Fragility,
and Systemic Risk 152-278 (Clarendon Press, 1992); Int’l Monetary Fund, World Economic
Outlook, May 2000: Asset Prices and the Business Cycle (available at <www.imf.org>)
[hereinafter cited as 2000 IMF World Economic Outlook], ch. 3; Luc Laeven, Daniela Klingebiel
& Randy Kroszner, “Financial Crises, Financial Dependence, and Industry Growth,” World Bank
Policy Working Paper 2855, June 2002 (available at <http://econ.worldbank.org>); Hal S. Scott
& Philip A. Wellons, International Finance: Transactions, Policy and Regulation 12-32
(Foundation Press, 8th ed. 2001).
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technology and the creation of innovative financial instruments (including securitized debt and
“junk bonds”) were undermining legal and institutional barriers that separated banks from
nonbank financial intermediaries in many countries. Over the next two decades, government
officials in both developed and developing countries progressively deregulated their banking
systems by abandoning foreign exchange controls, tearing down geographic barriers to entry and
removing restrictions on mergers and product diversification.
The competitive forces unleashed by innovation and deregulation created financial
markets that were dynamic and more efficient, but also more interdependent, volatile and fragile.
As a consequence, international markets have witnessed a series of financial crises since 1973.
More than 130 countries encountered serious banking problems during 1980-96, and East Asia
and Russia experienced devastating banking crises in 1997-98. In many nations, financial crises
occurred in conjunction with a boom-and-bust cycle in the general economy. In reviewing such
crises, analysts frequently concluded that a poorly-supervised deregulation of the banking sector
had encouraged financial institutions to pursue aggressive lending and investment policies,
thereby creating an unsustainable economic boom. In many cases, a rapid growth in financing
was linked to speculative valuations of illiquid assets (e.g., real estate and corporate securities)
that banks used for investments or as collateral for loans.2
2

For discussion of the links between deregulation, asset price booms and crises in
international financial markets since the 1970's, see, e.g., Roberto Chang & Andres Velasco, “A
Model of Financial Crises in Emerging Markets,” 116 Quarterly Journal of Economics 489
(2001); Davis, supra note 1, at 216-41, 256-73; Benton E. Gup, ed., International Banking Crises
passim (Quorum Books: Greenwood Pub. Group, Inc. 1999); Ari Hyytinen, “The Time Profile of
Risk in Banking Crises: Evidence from Scandinavian Banking Sectors,” 12 Applied Financial
Economics 613 (2002); George G. Kaufman, “Banking and Currency Crises and Systemic Risk:
Lessons from Recent Events,” Economic Perspectives (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., IL), 3d Qtr. 2000,
at 9 [hereinafter cited as Kaufman, “Banking Crises”]; Henry Kaufman, On Money and Markets:
4

Numerous countries incurred losses ranging from 4-40% of their gross domestic product
(“GDP”) in coping with financial disruptions. For example, the governments of Finland,
Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Norway, South Korea, Sweden and Thailand responded to systemic
banking crises by protecting all depositors against loss, and they also spent massive amounts to
recapitalize major banks during the 1990's. Mexico and South Korea each committed $100
billion or more for this purpose, while Japan has spent or budgeted $550 billion to support its
deeply troubled banking system. The International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) assisted many of
these bank rescue programs. During the 1990's, the IMF and its member nations supplied $250
billion of assistance to debtor countries, including programs totaling $145 billion for Indonesia,
Mexico and South Korea.3
Japan’s banking troubles since 1990 provide a particularly striking example of the

A Wall Street Memoir (McGraw-Hill, 2000) [hereinafter cited as Kaufman, On Money and
Markets], at 46-83, 122-35, 242-46, 287-321; Carl-Johan Lindgren et al., Bank Soundness and
Macroeconomic Policy passim (Int’l Monetary Fund, 1996); Ronnie J. Phillips & Richard D.
Johnson, “Regulating International Banking: Rationale, History, and Future Prospects,” in
Benton E. Gup, ed., The New Financial Architecture: Banking Regulation in the 21st Century
(Quorum Books: Greenwood Pub. Group, 2000), at 1, 1-8; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “How Should
We Respond to the Growing Risks of Financial Conglomerates?”, in Patricia A. McCoy, ed.,
Financial Modernization after Gramm-Leach-Bliley (LexisNexis Group, 2002), at 65, 68-70, 8590; 2000 IMF World Economic Outlook, supra note 1, at 77-78, 91-107.
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See, e.g., Hyytinen, supra note 1, at 613, 616-17; Kaufman, “Banking Crises,” supra
note 1, at 11-18; Allan H. Meltzer, “Back to Bailouts,” Wall Street Journal, Aug. 7, 2002, at
A14; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry,
1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks,” 2002 University of Illinois Law
Review 215 [hereinafter cited as Wilmarth, “Transformation”], at 308-11. See also Charles A.E.
Goodhart, The Central Bank and the Financial System 350-410 (1995) (finding, based on an
analysis of 104 major bank failures in international markets during 1973-93, that governmental
authorities (i) provided financial assistance or arranged mergers to rescue 73 of those banks
without any loss to depositors, and (ii) protected all or most of the depositors in 20 of the 31
remaining cases).
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apparent linkage between financial deregulation, asset booms, banking crises and impaired
macroeconomic performance. In the last half of the 1980's, the Bank of Japan’s lax monetary
policy fostered a large increase in bank lending that produced a “bubble economy.” Credit
expansion led to rapid increases in market values for Japanese real estate and securities, which in
turn encouraged banks to make further loans based on speculative valuations of land and stock
used as collateral. Japanese banks also built up huge portfolios of corporate shares, due to their
desire to profit from the booming stock market and to maintain strong cross-shareholding
relationships with nonbank firms that were members of the banks’ keiretsu (corporate groups).
Japanese banks had two additional incentives to make real estate loans and equity investments.
First, real estate loans helped to offset a decline in corporate lending that occurred when financial
liberalization enabled large Japanese companies to obtain credit through the Japanese bond
market and the Eurobond market. Second, Japanese regulators and the Basel Capital Accord of
1988 permitted Japanese banks to use unrealized capital gains from their stock portfolios to
satisfy a significant portion of their capital requirements.
The Bank of Japan tightened its monetary policy significantly in 1990 to discourage
further expansion of the “bubble economy.” In response to more restrictive credit conditions, the
Japanese real estate and stock markets both collapsed in the early 1990's, with values in each
sector falling by more than two-thirds. Two of the twenty largest Japanese banks failed, and
several other major banks were driven to the brink of insolvency. Two major securities firms and
three large insurance companies also failed. By the fall of 2002, Japanese banks had written off
more than $600 billion of nonperforming loans, but private sector analysts estimated that the
banks’ remaining bad debts still exceeded $1 trillion. Japanese banks also held severely
6

depreciated stock portfolios that impaired their ability to satisfy capital requirements. Japan’s
government failed to revive the economy after spending more than $1 trillion on economic
stimulus programs. The government also failed to restore the financial system despite spending
$200 billion and budgeting an additional $350 billion to support Japanese banks.
Japan’s banking crisis has crippled the Japanese economy in two ways. First, banks have
been reluctant to collect or charge off loans owed by failing companies, because aggressive
collection efforts would trigger a wave of corporate bankruptcies, and the required charge-offs
would seriously erode the capital of many banks. Second, the banks’ huge burden of
uncollectible debts has undermined their ability and willingness to make new loans to viable
Japanese businesses. The Japanese government’s financial capacity to resolve the crisis
remained doubtful in the autumn of 2002, because Japan was already saddled with a huge public
sector debt burden that exceeded 150% of its GDP.4
B.

U.S. Banking and Thrift Crises during 1980-92

4

For discussion of Japan’s “bubble economy” and its resulting financial crisis, see, e.g.,
Alan Ahearne et al., “Preventing Deflation: Lessons from Japan’s Experience in the 1990s,” Int’l
Finance Discussion Paper No. 729, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., June 2002 (available at
<www.federalreserve.gov>); Tamim Bayoumi & Charles Collyns, eds., Post-Bubble Blues: How
Japan Responded to Asset Price Collapse passim (Int’l Monetary Fund, 2000); Lynn E. Browne,
“Does Japan Offer Any Lessons for the United States?”, 2001 New England Economic Review
No. 3 (Fed. Res. Bank of Boston, MA), at 3; Allan D. Brunner & Steven B. Kamin, “Bank
Lending and Economic Activity in Japan: Did ‘Financial Factors’ Contribute to the Recent
Downturn?”, 3 International Journal of Finance and Economics 73 (1998); Takeo Hoshi & Anil
Kashyap, “The Japanese Banking Crisis: Where Did It Come from and How Will It End?”, in
Ben Bernanke, ed., 1999 NBER Macroeconomics Annual 129; Wilmarth, “Transformation,”
supra note 3, at 308, 451-53. For analysis of Japan’s continuing economic and financial
problems in the autumn of 2002, see, e.g., Ken Belson, “A Sick Banking System Resists
Therapy,” New York Times, Oct. 29, 2002, at C1; James Brooke, “Fears of a Hard Landing
Rattle Tokyo,” New York Times, Oct. 10, 2002, at W1; Akio Mikuni & R. Taggart Murphy,
“Trapped in Japan’s Bank Crisis,” New York Times, Oct. 29, 2002, at A31; Adam Posen, “For
Japan, It’s Every Which Way but Back,” Washington Post, Oct. 20, 2002, at B5.
7

The banking and thrift industries in the United States were severely shaken during the
1980's and early 1990's by a systemic crisis that was associated with deregulation and a boomand-bust cycle in the U.S. economy. Beginning in 1980, federal and state governments greatly
expanded the real estate lending powers of banks and thrifts. Federal and state officials
encouraged consolidation by liberalizing geographic restrictions on branching and relaxing
antitrust rules governing mergers. Federal and state officials also permitted thrifts to make large
investments in junk bonds, commercial real estate projects and a wide array of other ventures.
Nor did federal regulators object when banks made extensive loans to energy producers and
corporations engaged in leveraged buyouts (“LBOs”).
Legislators and regulators believed that deregulation would help banks and thrifts to
overcome a significant erosion that was occurring in their traditional lending businesses.
Corporate borrowers increasingly bypassed banks by selling commercial paper and issuing junk
bonds in the credit markets. At the same time, inflation and securitization created a residential
mortgage market that was more competitive, more volatile and less profitable for thrifts.
Government officials concluded that deregulation would enable banks and thrifts to modernize
their operations and “grow out of their problems.” Congress expanded deposit insurance
coverage from $40,000 to $100,000 per depositor, while federal deposit insurers charged flat-rate
premiums that failed to take account of the risk profile of each insured institution. Due to the
low-cost funding opportunities provided by flat-rate deposit insurance and a nationwide network
of deposit brokers, aggressive banks and thrifts had strong incentives to use insured deposits to
finance their risky loans and investments.
In combination, deregulation and financial innovation produced a rapid expansion of
8

private sector credit for real estate development, energy production, LBO transactions and other
corporate takeovers. Between 1980 and 1989, outstanding junk bonds increased from $30 billion
to $210 billion, and junk bonds’ share of the corporate debt market grew from 13% to 27%.
During the same period, nonfinancial corporate debt rose by $1.6 trillion, and real estate
developers obtained financing to build more than $1 trillion of commercial projects. Bank
lending to business firms and real estate developers more than doubled during the 1980's, while
thrift lending to such borrowers expanded at a comparable rate until 1986. By 1990, banks held
about $250 billion of commercial real estate loans and $150 billion of LBO loans, while thrifts
held more than $100 billion of commercial real estate loans and $12 billion of junk bonds.
The real estate, energy production and LBO markets all collapsed by the end of the
1980's, with devastating consequences for banks, thrifts and the U.S. economy. During 1980-94,
U.S. regulators spent almost $200 billion of deposit insurance funds and taxpayer revenues to
resolve the failures of 2,900 banks and thrifts, which collectively held more than $900 billion of
assets. U.S. officials protected all insured depositors in failed banks and thrifts, and they also
protected uninsured depositors and payments system creditors in several “too big to fail”
(“TBTF”) banks that failed or were threatened with failure during 1980-92. Some of the most
aggressive and fastest-growing banks and thrifts of the 1980's (e.g., Bank of New England,
Continental Illinois Bank, First City, First RepublicBank, CenTrust Savings, Imperial Savings
and Lincoln Savings) became prominent casualties by the end of the decade. Regulators also
granted extensive forbearance to some very large troubled banks, including Bank of America and
Citicorp.
The banking and thrift crises of the 1980's produced a prolonged “credit crunch” that had
9

significant adverse effects on U.S. economic growth during the early 1990's. Bank and thrift
failures disrupted credit relationships with many borrowers. Surviving institutions were
generally reluctant to extend new loans until they had repaired their balance sheets and the
economy had shown clear signs of recovery from the recession of 1990-91. Bank lending to
businesses and real estate developers declined in each year during 1990-92, and did not show any
significant recovery until 1994.5
C.

The Recent Boom-and-Bust Cycle in U.S. Securities Markets

During the 1990's, Congress and federal regulators adopted deregulatory measures that
encouraged large commercial banks to expand geographically and diversify their lines of
business. In 1994, for example, Congress removed all legal barriers to interstate bank mergers
and acquisitions. The new nationwide banking regime promoted a consolidation movement that
enabled the ten largest banks to increase their combined share of U.S. banking industry assets
from 26% to 49% during the 1990's. In addition, by 1998 federal regulators and the courts had
allowed banks to make substantial inroads into the securities and insurance sectors by exploiting
loopholes in two statutes – the Banking Act of 1933 (popularly known as the “Glass-Steagall
Act”) and the Bank Holding Company Act (“BHC Act”) – that previously had been viewed as
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For discussions of the causes and consequences of the banking and thrift crises of the
1980's and early 1990's, see, e.g., Edward Chancellor, Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of
Financial Speculation 255-82 (1999); Kaufman, On Money and Markets, supra note 1, at 273-81,
347-49; L. William Seidman, Full Faith and Credit: The Great S&L Debacle and Other
Washington Sagas 139-97, 229-39 (Times Books: Random House, 1993); Wilmarth,
“Transformation,” supra note 3, at 313-16, 327-28, 355-57, 412; Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp., History of the Eighties: Lessons for the Future (1997), Vol. I, at 137-88, 235-54, 291-378.
For narrative descriptions of major bank failures, and for data regarding bank and thrift failures
and resolution costs during 1980-94, see Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Managing the Crisis:
The FDIC and RTC Experience 509-704, 794-99, 807-09, 860-63 (1998).
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strong legal barriers to bank entry into the securities and insurance fields. Congress ratified this
diversification of banking powers when it passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (“GLB
Act”), which authorized banks to affiliate with securities firms and insurance companies by
establishing financial holding companies. In confirming this grant of “universal banking”
powers to financial holding companies, the GLB Act repealed several provisions of the GlassSteagall Act (“G-S Act”) and the BHC Act.
By the time Congress adopted the GLB Act, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase and Bank of
America had already established large investment banking operations that competed with the
“big three” Wall Street firms (Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley) and three
major European universal banks (Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank and UBS).6 As domestic and
foreign banks entered the securities business, they offered generous loan commitments to attract
customers for securities underwriting and merger advisory work. The major Wall Street firms
responded by offering their own “package deals” that included lending, underwriting and
advisory services. This fierce competition for investment banking clients fostered a huge
expansion in debt and equity financing for business firms in the United States. The annual
volume of syndicated loans rose from less than $400 million in 1993 to more than $1 trillion in
each year during 1997-2000. Similarly, the annual volume of underwritten public offerings of
corporate debt and equity securities grew from less than $900 billion in 1992 to more than $1.8
6

In both 2000 and 2001, the foregoing nine institutions and Lehman Brothers were the
top-ranked global underwriters of stocks and bonds. See “2001 Underwriting Rankings: Global
Stocks and Bonds,” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 2, 2002, at R19 (also showing that those 10
institutions accounted for 75% of all global underwriting proceeds in 2000-01). For a discussion
of the consolidation of the U.S. banking industry and the entry of U.S. and foreign banks into the
securities and insurance businesses during the 1990's, see Wilmarth, “Transformation,” supra
note 3, at 225-27, 250-56, 318-32, 418-21, 427-28, 438-50.
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trillion in each year during 1998-2000.7
A similar surge of debt financing occurred in the consumer sector. Large banks,
securities firms and finance companies created a nationwide market for securities backed by
consumer debt. The growth of securitized consumer credit accelerated after federal courts issued
decisions that effectively destroyed state-law limitations on maximum interest rates for consumer
loans. By 2002, commercial and investment banks had sold asset-backed securities representing
some $7 trillion of consumer debt.8
The competition for market-based financing among banks, securities firms and finance
companies has resulted in a dramatic increase in leverage and risk for both corporate and
consumer borrowers. During 1990-2002, the outstanding debt of U.S. nonfinancial firms rose
from $2.4 trillion to $4.9 trillion. Outstanding junk bonds tripled during the same period and
reached $600 billion. During 1995-2001, total U.S. consumer debt (including home mortgage
loans) grew from $4.5 trillion to $7.2 trillion. Banks and nonbank lenders increasingly marketed
7

Emily Thornton et al., “The Breakdown in Banking,” Business Week, Oct. 7, 2002, at
40 [hereinafter cited as Thornton et al., “Breakdown in Banking”], at 41; Wilmarth,
“Transformation,” supra note 3, at 326-28, 378-81, 411-12; Securities Industry Ass’n, 2001
Securities Industry Fact Book, at 12, 24-25.
8

Keith Athreya, “The Growth of Unsecured Credit: Are We Better Off?,” 87 Economic
Review No. 3 (Fed. Res. Bank of Richmond, VA), at 11, 11-15; Thornton et al., “Breakdown in
Banking,” supra note 7, at 41; Wilmarth, “Transformation,” supra note 3, at 388-90. Federal
courts have held that two federal statutes – 12 U.S.C. §§ 85 & 1831d – allow national banks and
state banks that are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) to “export”
interest rates from any state in which they are “located” to borrowers residing in other states.
Based on these decisions, large banks have avoided restrictive state usury laws by locating their
consumer lending operations in states (e.g., Delaware and South Dakota) that are willing to
attract those operations by abolishing all limitations on consumer lending rates. See Marquette
National Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978); Smiley v. Citibank (South
Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996); Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818 (1st
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1052 (1993).
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credit services to higher-risk “subprime” consumer borrowers, and those borrowers held a third
of all credit card loans and a tenth of all home mortgages and home equity loans by 2002. As a
result of this rapid growth in private sector credit, (i) U.S. corporate debt rose to record levels as
a percentage of both GDP and corporate profits, and (ii) U.S. household debt exceeded annual
household income for the first time in postwar economic history.9
Rising debt levels and a slowing U.S. economy have produced a sharp rise in troubled
corporate and consumer loans. By 2002, a record $880 billion of corporate bonds were either in
distress or in default, including 45% of all outstanding junk bonds. The volume of syndicated
loans criticized by bank examiners rose to $240 billion, a fivefold increase since 1998.
Delinquencies on consumer loans (including mortgage loans) reached their highest level since the
recession of 1990-91. Growing consumer debt burdens also produced a large increase in
personal bankruptcy filings, which rose from 700,000 in 1990 to more than 1.3 million in each
year during 1997-2001.10
The greatest excesses of the financing boom of the 1990's occurred in the information
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Carrick Mollenkamp, “Credit-Card Scrutiny Hits Lenders and Threatens to Damp
Spending,” Wall Street Journal, Aug. 19, 2002, at A1; Wilmarth, “Transformation,” supra note 3,
at 232, 383-85, 392-96, Heather Timmons, “Surprise! The Little Guy Loses,” Business Week,
July 8, 2002, at 42; Gregory Zuckerman, “Debtor Nation: Borrowing Levels Reach a Record,
Sparking Debate,” Wall Street Journal, July 15, 2000, at C1; “Dicing with debt,” Economist, Jan.
26, 2002, at 22.
10

Patrick Barta, “Signs of Strain: After Long Boom, Weaknesses Appear in Housing
Market,” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 3, 2002, at A1; Richard Cowden, “Large, Syndicated Loan
Problems Rise,” 79 BNA’s Banking Report 599 (Oct. 14, 2002); Peter Coy et al., “Consumer
Credit: A Crunch May Be Coming,” Business Week, Aug. 12, 2002, at 32; Loretta J. Mester, “Is
the Personal Bankruptcy System Bankrupt?”, Business Review (Fed. Res. Bank of Phila., PA),
1st Qtr. 2002, at 31, 33 (Figures 1 & 2); Thornton et al., “Breakdown in Banking,” supra note 7,
at 41-42; Wilmarth, “Transformation,” supra note 3, at 382-85, 394-98.
13

technology (“high-tech”) and telecommunications (“telecom”) industries. The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the implementing rules adopted by the Federal
Communications Commission deregulated the telecom industry and encouraged new firms to
enter markets that had long been dominated by the regional Bell companies. Banks, securities
firms and venture capital funds provided debt and equity financing to a myriad of high-tech and
telecom firms, including many unproven, start-up ventures. During 1996-2001, the telecom
industry received $1.3 trillion in debt financing from syndicated loans and bond offerings, as well
as hundreds of billions of dollars in equity financing from initial public offerings (“IPOs”). By
2000, new entrants into the telecom business included 6,000 Internet providers, 250 local
telephone companies, and a half-dozen long distance carriers.
However, in early 2000 it became clear that these “new economy” firms would fall far
short of their optimistic forecasts for revenues and earnings, because they had created operating
capacity that far exceeded customer demand. For example, telecom firms installed millions of
miles of fiber-optic cables with the expectation that Internet traffic would double every hundred
days. Instead, Internet use grew at a much slower rate, and less than 3% of the installed fiberoptic lines were actually needed to meet customer demand. As a result of this glut of excess
capacity, telecom firms suffered an estimated negative cash flow of $60 billion in 2000. When
market participants realized the magnitude of the telecom industry’s problems, they rapidly sold
off shares of high-tech and telecom companies, and the debt and equity markets virtually shut
down for those firms.11 Investors similarly dumped the stocks of large energy companies that had
11

For discussion of the rapid expansion and collapse of the telecom industry during
1996-2002, see, e.g., Yochi J. Dreazen, “Behind the Fiber Glut: Telecom Carriers Were Driven
by Wildly Optimistic Data on Internet’s Growth,” Wall Street Journal, Sept. 26, 2002, at B1;
14

aggressively expanded their energy trading operations after federal and state agencies deregulated
energy markets in the 1990's.12
The collapse of high-tech and telecom stock prices triggered a broad downturn in U.S.
equity markets during 2001-02. Investors manifested a general loss of confidence, due in part to
stunning disclosures of fraudulent financial reporting and other serious misconduct at some of
the most glamorous corporate “stars” of the 1990's (e.g., Adelphia, Enron, Global Crossing,
Qwest, Tyco and WorldCom). Between March 2000 and September 2002, the NASDAQ market
index (representing primarily the stocks of high-tech and telecom firms) fell by more than threequarters, while the broader S&P 500 index declined by almost one-half. In the process, investors
lost an estimated $8 trillion in paper wealth.13
Like their U.S. counterparts, European equity markets experienced a prolonged slump in

Remarks by Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”), “World Finance
and Risk Management,” Sept. 25, 2002 (available at <www.federalreserve.gov>) [hereinafter
cited as Greenspan, “Risk Management”]; Steven Pearlstein, “Fiber-Optic Overdose Racks Up
Casualties,” Washington Post, May 2, 2002, at A1; Steve Rosenbush & Heather Timmons,
“Telecom Lenders: Standing in Line for What?”, Business Week, Feb. 11, 2002, at 62; Jacob M.
Schlesinger, “The Deregulators: Did Washington Help Set Stage for Current Business
Turmoil?”, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 17, 2002, at A1; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “Controlling
Systemic Risk in an Era of Financial Consolidation,” in Roy C. Baban, ed., Current
Developments in Monetary and Financial Law (Int’l Monetary Fund, 2003), Vol. 3 (forthcoming)
[hereinafter cited as Wilmarth, “Systemic Risk”), Part II(C)(3)(a); Special report: The telecoms
crisis: Too many debts; too few calls, Economist, July 20, 2002, at 59.
12

Peter Behr, Dynegy Ends Power-Trading Operations, Washington Post, Oct. 17, 2002,
at E1; Schlesinger, supra note 11; Energy trading: Prepare to be shocked, Economist, May 18,
2002.
13
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Failure: Corporate America Has Lost Its Way,” Fortune, June 24, 2002, at 62.
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2000-02. The end of the high-tech and telecom booms created economic hardships for a wide
range of companies on both sides of the Atlantic. The U.S. economy struggled through a
recession and a slow recovery, while economic growth in the European Union ground to a virtual
halt. In both the U.S. and Europe, the prospects for a strong economic recovery appeared very
doubtful in late 2002. Observers concluded that the surge of debt and equity financing in the
late 1990's had created significant problems with overcapacity in many economic sectors.14
The bursting of the stock market “bubble” in 2000-02 has been blamed on a variety of
factors, including (i) “irrational exuberance” that impaired the judgment of too many investors,
(ii) “infectious greed” that tempted too many corporate executives, and (iii) conflicts of interest
that undermined the effectiveness of too many outside monitors of corporate performance,
including public accountants, securities analysts and credit rating agencies.15 This article will
14
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See Robert J. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (Princeton Univ. Press, 2000) (quoting
Alan Greenspan’s statement that the U.S. stock market exhibited “irrational exuberance” in late
1996, id. at 3, and offering reasons for the excessive optimism of investors during the “most
dramatic bull market in U.S. history,” id. at 5); Federal Reserve Board’s Semiannual Monetary
Policy Report to the Congress: Testimony of FRB Chairman Alan Greenspan before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, July 16, 2002 (available at
<www.federalreserve.gov>), at 5 (stating that “corporate governance checks and balances” broke
down during the late 1990's because “the rapid enlargement of stock market capitalizations . . .
arguably engendered an outsized increase in opportunities for avarice” and thereby fostered an
“infectious greed [that] seemed to grip much of our business community”). For evidence that a
speculative “bubble” existed in the U.S. stock market in early 2000, which could not be justified
by economic fundamentals, see, e.g., Shiller, supra, at 5-16, 183-93; 2000 IMF World Economic
Outlook, supra note 1, at 79-88, 110-12. For evidence that conflicts of interest impaired the
objectivity and reliability of securities analysts, public accounting firms and credit rating
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focus on allegations that large commercial and investment banks promoted transactions that
involved excessive risks to investors, the financial system and the broader economy.
By the autumn of 2002, government officials and private litigants had filed legal claims
asserting that the following financial institutions had committed serious misconduct:
•

Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase (“Chase”) and Merrill Lynch allegedly helped Enron’s

fraudulent reporting schemes by entering into prepaid commodity forward transactions with
Enron and with offshore entities that were established and controlled by the banks. These threeparty derivatives contracts allegedly provided $8 billion of debt financing to Enron but were
recorded on Enron’s financial statements as commodity trades, thereby materially understating
Enron’s debt and overstating its trading revenues.
•

During 1997-2000, Citigroup’s Salomon Smith Barney unit became the leading

investment bank for the telecom industry. During this period, Citigroup earned an estimated $1
billion in fees and raised $190 billion of debt and equity financing for its telecom clients. Jack
Grubman, Citigroup’s main telecom analyst, played a key role in arranging financing and merger
deals for many of the most aggressive firms in the telecom industry. Citigroup rewarded senior
executives of its clients by allowing them to buy underpriced shares in IPOs underwritten by
Citigroup. Grubman was also one of the most bullish cheerleaders for the telecom industry in his
reports for investors. Ten large companies that Grubman advised and recommended to investors
– including Global Crossing, Winstar and WorldCom – filed for bankruptcy by mid-2002.

agencies during the late 1990's, see, e.g., Wilmarth, “Systemic Risk,” supra note 11, Part
II(C)(2); “Financial Oversight of Enron: The SEC and Private-Sector Watchdogs,” Report of the
Staff of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Oct. 8. 2002 [hereinafter cited as Senate
Private-Sector Watchdog Report], at 26-28, 69-127.
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Grubman failed to give timely warnings to investors about the grave problems confronting these
firms, despite the knowledge he reportedly gained through his close ties to senior management.
•

In May 2001, Citigroup and Chase acted as lead underwriters for an $11.8 billion

public bond offering by WorldCom. That offering enabled WorldCom to pay off outstanding
loans owed to Citigroup, Chase and other banks. The offering also allowed WorldCom to satisfy
its working capital needs in 2001 without requesting additional bank loans. WorldCom suddenly
defaulted on its bonds and filed for bankruptcy in 2002, while disclosing that it had overstated its
profits by more than $7 billion since 1998. Bondholders alleged that (i) the self-interest of
Citigroup and Chase as leading lenders to WorldCom conflicted with their duties as underwriters,
and (ii) the banks failed to act with due diligence in ensuring that WorldCom’s financial
statements were accurate when WorldCom made its bond offering.16
•

Credit Suisse, Merrill Lynch and other major financial institutions allegedly adopted

promotion and compensation policies that pressured their securities analysts to issue strong
recommendations in favor of existing or potential investment banking clients, without regard to
the clients’ actual financial condition or prospects. In addition, Credit Suisse and Goldman
Sachs reportedly allocated underpriced shares in IPOs to executives of clients and venture capital
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firms for the purpose of winning investment banking deals.17
In sum, critics charged that the entry of large commercial banks into the investment
banking business in the 1990's had (i) created structural conflicts of interest that impaired the
objectivity of lending decisions, securities underwriting and investment advice, and (ii) promoted
a highly competitive, deal-oriented culture that encouraged both banks and Wall Street firms to
offer loans and underwrite securities that were not justified by any reasonable assessment of the
long-term viability of the enterprises being financed.18 Press accounts indicated, for example,
that the quest for investment banking fees had produced the following perverse behavior among
banks: (1) encouraging clients to endorse wildly optimistic business plans that would justify
bigger mergers and larger securities offerings, (2) offering loans only to clients that agreed to
retain the banks for underwriting or merger advisory services, and (3) threatening to cut off
research coverage for firms that were former IPO clients but failed to retain the banks for
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continuing services.19
As of October 2002, the stock market slump and economic slowdown in the U.S. and
Europe had not yet produced a severe banking crisis. However, twenty-seven U.S. banks and
thrifts, holding combined assets of nearly $7 billion, failed during 1999-2002, a failure rate that
was significantly higher than the comparable figures for 1995-98.20 In addition, leading U.S. and
European financial conglomerates – including ABN-Amro, Allianz-Dresdner, J.P. Morgan
Chase, Commerzbank, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, FleetBoston, Merrill Lynch and Morgan
Stanley – reported steep declines in earnings during 2001-02, due to problems with
nonperforming loans, lower demand for investment banking services and large losses on equity
investments. Analysts warned that major banks on both continents would probably confront
much higher loan default rates if their economies endured a prolonged slump, because business
firms and consumers were dangerously overburdened with debt.21 Observers also cautioned that
19
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U.S. and European economies were particularly vulnerable to a downturn in their housing
markets, because consumers were relying heavily on increased home equity values to support
their spending habits and offset declining shareholder wealth.22
Some commentators maintained that major banks did not face a significant threat in late
2002, because banks had transferred many of the risks of their lending and underwriting activities
to institutional investors, including insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds. It is
true that large banks have used risk management vehicles – including syndicated business loans,
securitized consumer loans, financial derivatives and credit derivatives – to transfer a wide
variety of risks to institutional investors. However, the complex terms and/or proprietary nature
of these transactions have made it much harder for regulators and the financial markets to
evaluate the true risks and liabilities retained by banks. In addition, because banks are
increasingly transferring their risks to other investors, analysts have questioned whether banks
currently have short-term incentives for generating transactional fees that outweigh their longterm reputational interest in making prudent judgments about the creditworthiness of borrowers.
Yet another problem is that the liquidity, market value and enforceability of risk
management vehicles have been subject to sudden adverse changes during financial crises of the
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1980's and 1990's. During those disruptions, many syndications, securitizations and derivatives
failed to perform as anticipated, because (i) their liquidity and market values were impaired by
the actual or threatened default of either banks or their counterparties, or (ii) counterparties
challenged the ability of banks to enforce these arrangements because of alleged violations of
disclosure duties or other legal obligations. As a consequence, some observers have argued that
major banks confront serious risks that are not accurately reflected on their financial statements
and also are not adequately controlled by capital rules or other supervisory requirements.23
II.

Financial Liberalization and the Great Depression of 1929-33
A.

The Expansion of Bank Involvement in the Real Estate and Securities
Markets after World War I

Prior to 1900, national banks were prohibited from making real estate loans and were also
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largely barred from underwriting, dealing or investing in securities.24 In response to changing
competitive conditions, federal authorities granted significantly broader powers to national banks
during the first three decades of the twentieth century. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913
permitted national banks headquartered in small cities and rural areas to make loans secured by
farm land. In 1916, Congress authorized all national banks to make loans secured by any type of
real estate with terms of up to one year. The McFadden Act of 1927 allowed all national banks
to make real estate loans with terms of up to five years, provided such loans did not exceed 25%
of a bank’s capital and surplus or 50% of its time deposits.25
In the early 1900's, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) informally
allowed national banks to establish bond departments, which could underwrite, sell and invest in
debt securities issued by federal, state and local governments and corporations. The McFadden
Act of 1927 ratified the legality of the OCC’s policy on bond departments. The McFadden Act
did not authorize national banks to underwrite, sell or invest in corporate stocks. However, as a
practical matter, this omission did not significantly restrain the securities activities of national
banks. Since 1908, national banks had circumvented statutory restrictions by organizing
affiliated corporations, which engaged in a full range of underwriting, selling and dealing
activities involving both bonds and stocks. Prior to the Great Depression, federal authorities did

24
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Chapman, supra note 24, at 199, 585-89.
23

not interfere with these securities affiliates.26
Federal authorities expanded the real estate lending and securities powers of national
banks because they wanted national banks to compete more successfully with state-chartered
banks and trust companies (which enjoyed similar or greater powers under state law). Both
national banks and state banks had strong incentives to enter the real estate and securities markets
after World War I. Commercial banks had been the primary providers of credit to large
corporations before 1920. During the 1920's, however, major corporations greatly reduced their
borrowing from banks and instead turned to the securities markets for most of their external
financing. Commercial banks saw the real estate and securities markets as attractive new profit
sources to offset the decline in their traditional corporate lending business.27
Federal officials also liberalized the deposit-taking powers for national banks to give
them greater parity with state banks. Prior to 1900, national banks could accept only deposits
that could be withdrawn on demand. In 1903, the OCC began allowing national banks to accept
time (savings) deposits so that national banks could compete more effectively with state-

26
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chartered commercial banks and mutual savings banks. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913
expressly authorized national banks and state banks that were members of the Federal Reserve
System to accept time deposits. The Act (as amended in 1917) also made time deposits a very
attractive funding source for member banks, because it prescribed reserve requirements for time
deposits that were much lower than the reserve requirements applicable to demand deposits.28
Time deposits in national banks almost tripled during 1919-29, and time deposits increased from
34% of total member bank deposits in 1921 to 46% of such deposits in 1931.29 The longer
maturities and higher yields for time deposits encouraged banks to invest those deposits in
longer-term and less liquid assets that had a higher perceived potential for earnings, such as real
estate loans, loans on securities, and investments in corporate and foreign securities.30
In sum, the liberalization of bank powers after 1900 was fueled by (i) competition for
bank charters between federal and state authorities, and (ii) rivalry between the banking and
securities industries. Commercial banks rapidly expanded their presence in the real estate and
securities markets after 1918. Commercial banks more than tripled their real estate loans
between World War I and the Great Depression. During the same period, national banks’ real
estate loans grew by a factor of ten. Most of this increase in real estate lending occurred in urban
markets, which enjoyed boom conditions during most of the 1920's. In contrast, bank loans
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secured by farm land showed very little growth after 1920, due to the agricultural economy’s
slump after World War I.31
During the 1920's, commercial banks greatly expanded three types of securities-related
activities. First, bank loans on securities grew from $5.2 billion to $13.0 billion during 1919-30,
with the consequence that loans on securities rose from 24% to 38% of total bank loans during
that period.32 Second, banks greatly increased their investments in more risky, higher-yielding
securities and shifted away from safer, lower-yielding U.S. government bonds. The total
securities investments of commercial banks grew from $8.4 billion to $13.7 billion during 192130. Four-fifths of this growth represented additional investments in state and municipal bonds,
corporate bonds and foreign securities. As a result, the percentage of U.S. government bonds
held in the securities portfolios of commercial banks declined from 35% to 26%.33
Third, commercial banks greatly expanded their involvement in securities underwriting
during the 1920's, and they reached competitive parity with investment banks by the end of the
decade. The number of commercial banks engaged in securities underwriting through bond
departments or securities affiliates more than doubled, rising from 277 in 1922 to 591 in 1929.
Banks and their affiliates originated 22% and participated in 37% of all bond issues in 1927. By
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1929, banks and their affiliates originated 45% and participated in 51% of all bond issues.34
The leading bank securities affiliate was National City Company (“NCC”), which was
established in 1911 by National City Bank (“NCB”). By 1929, NCC had built the world’s
largest securities distribution network, which included more than fifty U.S. offices and sales
representatives working in NCB’s eighty-nine foreign branches. NCC’s market power was
demonstrated by (i) its origination or participation in offerings for a fifth of all domestic and
foreign bonds issued in the United States during 1921-29, and (ii) its status as the largest
distributor of domestic and foreign bonds issued in the United States during 1927-31. Chase
National Bank (“Chase”) established the second largest securities affiliate, Chase Securities
Corp. (“CSC”). By acquiring Harris Forbes & Co. in 1930, CSC built a selling network that also
included more than fifty domestic offices and numerous foreign locations.35
Large-scale entry by commercial banks into the real estate and securities markets caused a
dramatic change in their balance sheets. Real estate loans and loans on securities accounted for
only 30% of commercial bank loans in 1919 but rose to half of such loans in 1929.36 As
previously noted, the investment portfolios of commercial banks grew by more than $5 billion
during the 1920's, and four-fifths of this growth was concentrated in higher-risk and less liquid
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securities.37 While the primary assets of commercial banks in 1918 had been short-term, selfliquidating commercial paper and U.S. government securities, by 1929 the principal assets of
commercial banks were “loans and investments whose liquidity depended on general capital
values” in the securities and real estate markets.38 The heavy reliance of banks on the health of
the real estate and securities markets proved to be disastrous during the Great Depression.
B.

The Impact of Financial Liberalization on the Asset Boom of the 1920's and
the Banking Crisis of 1930-33

Senator Carter Glass, Representative Henry Steagall and other proponents of the G-S Act
were convinced that banks had played a significant role in promoting unsustainable booms in the
real estate and securities markets during the 1920's. As adherents of the “real bills doctrine,”
Glass and his principal banking advisor, Professor H. Parker Willis, maintained that commercial
banks should restrict their operations to the acceptance of demand deposits and the extension of
short-term, self-liquidating loans to finance the production and sale of goods by business firms.
Glass and Willis believed that these restraints on commercial bank activities would (i) maintain a
basic equilibrium between prudent bank lending and legitimate business needs for credit, and (ii)
prevent banks from financing illiquid and speculative investments that were likely to produce a
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boom-and-bust cycle in the general economy. 39
As one of the principal architects of the Federal Reserve System, Glass believed that the
Federal Reserve Banks should (i) provide appropriate liquidity services to member banks by
discounting short-term commercial paper, and (ii) discourage speculative activities by member
banks, including loans or investments that facilitated “stock gambling.” By 1931, Glass and
Willis concluded that the Federal Reserve System had failed to provide the liquidity needed by
banks and had also been derelict in restraining speculative activities by banks. Glass and Willis
therefore pushed for legislation that would prevent member banks from using the Federal
Reserve discount window for speculative purposes, and would also separate commercial banks
from the investment banking business.40 In advocating such legislation, Glass, Steagall and their
supporters argued that (1) banks had made unsound loans and investments that encouraged an
“overbuilt” real estate market and an “immense over-expansion of real estate values,”41 (2) banks
had made imprudent investments in securities that undermined their solvency after the stock

39
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market crashed,42 and (3) banks had made excessive loans to finance the purchase of securities,
and their affiliates had underwritten too many unsound and speculative issues, thereby
contributing to the “overinvestment” in securities that jeopardized banks, investors and the
general economy. 43
Beginning in the 1980's, several prominent scholars challenged the factual premises and
policy justifications for the G-S Act.44 In adopting the GLB Act in 1999, Congress determined
that the G-S Act’s constraints on affiliations between banks and securities firms had become
“unsuitable and outdated.”45 A comprehensive analysis of the merits and shortcomings of the GS Act is beyond the scope of this article. I plan to address that topic in a future work.
For present purposes, I wish to make three points. First, bank involvement in the real
estate and securities markets during the 1920's was associated with unsustainable asset booms in
both markets. Second, excessive exposure to real estate loans, loans on securities and investment
securities was a major factor in many bank failures during the 1930's. Third, many of the largest
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and most devastating bank failures during the 1930's involved institutions that were heavily
involved in either the real estate market or the securities market or both. These large bank
failures had severe macroeconomic effects that compelled the federal government to undertake a
massive recapitalization program through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (“RFC”) and a
comprehensive deposit insurance program through the FDIC.
1.

The contribution of banks to boom conditions in the real estate and

securities markets. The involvement of banks in the real estate and securities markets helped to
produce spectacular booms in both sectors during the 1920's. Commercial banks more than
tripled their real estate lending during the 1920's, and securities affiliates of banks also competed
with investment banks in issuing mortgage bonds to investors. By 1929, outstanding debts
secured by real estate included $37 billion of urban mortgages and some $6-$8 billion of
mortgage bonds. Commercial banks held more than 10% of these obligations as assets on their
balance sheets. Due to this massive influx of real estate financing, the volume of new
construction activity rose from less than $4 billion in 1921 to more than $54 billion during 192228. Nearly $35 billion was invested in building new homes during the 1920's, and many
apartments, hotels and office buildings were also constructed. Analysts concluded that many
urban real estate markets had become “overbuilt” and highly speculative by 1929.46
The boom in the securities markets was even more remarkable. Annual offerings of debt
and equity securities by U.S. corporations nearly tripled, rising from $2.8 billion in 1920 to an
average of $7.6 billion during 1927-29. Annual offerings of foreign stocks and bonds more than
46
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doubled, growing from $600 million in 1920 to an average of $1.4 billion during 1924-28. The
number of shares traded annually on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) more than
quadrupled, increasing from 230 million in 1920 to 1 billion in 1928-29.47 Based on a
widespread belief among investors that the U.S. economy had entered a “new era” of permanent
economic growth, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (“DJIA”) skyrocketed from 64 in August
1921 to 382 in September 1929. The price-earnings ratio for the S&P Composite Index of stocks
multiplied by a factor of six during the 1920's and reached 32.6 in September 1929, a record that
lasted until the peak of the bull market in early 2000.48
Several scholars have concluded that the stock market boom produced a speculative
“bubble” during its final, frenzied stage in 1928-29.49 Those are the same two years during
which (i) commercial banks and their affiliates accomplished the most spectacular growth in their
securities underwriting and retail selling activities, and (ii) securities firms responded by
organizing and selling units in hundreds of investment trusts (similar to today’s mutual funds) to
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small investors.50
Speculative activities during the 1920's produced a rapid buildup of consumer and
business debt, which left the U.S. economy in a highly leveraged state on the eve of the Great
Depression. Mortgage loans and bonds on urban real estate quadrupled to almost $40 billion by
1929, with half of that amount owed by homeowners. Consumer non-mortgage debt more than
doubled to $7.6 billion, as merchants encouraged consumers to buy cars, household appliances
and other durable goods on installment credit. Banks financed a significant portion of this
growth in consumer credit by purchasing installment paper from merchant creditors.51 Banks
also provided most of the loans on securities, including broker call loans. During the 1920's,
loans on securities more than doubled to $16 billion, which “represented 18% of the value of all
listed stocks [in 1929], an enormous proportion to be held on credit.”52 U.S. corporations issued
nearly $30 billion of bonds during the 1920's, increasing their total indebtedness to almost $90
billion by 1929.53 Debt service relative to GDP reached 9% for the United States in 1929,
compared to only 3.9% for Canada. This high degree of leverage in the U.S. economy – which
was spurred by rosy expectations of continued economic growth – exposed consumers, business
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firms, banks and institutional investors to devastating financial shocks during the Great
Depression.54
2.

Bank failures resulting from exposure to the real estate and securities

markets. Losses from real estate loans and securities investments were major causes of bank
failures during 1930-33. Default rates rose rapidly for both residential and commercial
mortgages and reached crisis proportions by 1931-32. Real estate values in many urban areas fell
by 25-40% during 1929-31, and a large number of urban real estate markets were essentially
“frozen” by 1932. Banks often could not liquidate nonperforming loans by foreclosing on them,
because no buyers were available to pay any reasonable price for the underlying property. For
national banks, real estate loans as a percentage of capital and surplus rose from 24% in 1926 to
44% in 1930 and 57% in 1932. During 1930-32, the capital funds of national banks declined
from $3.9 billion to $3.1 billion. The illiquid status of defaulted real estate loans was evidently a
significant factor explaining the loss of bank capital during the early 1930's.55 Moreover, as
described in the next section, several of the largest clusters of bank failures occurred in urban
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areas that had the heaviest concentrations of bank real estate loans and investments.
Many banks were also devastated by depreciation in their securities portfolios. The
market values of corporate and foreign bonds with less than an “A” rating fell sharply during
1930-32. Investor losses on South American and Eastern European bonds were especially
severe, because three-quarters of those bonds defaulted during the 1930's.56 One analysis of
closed New York state banks found that their securities portfolios had suffered an average loss in
market value of 37.5%. Similarly, a study of closed Michigan state banks determined that
depreciation in their bond portfolios (especially with regard to real estate bonds) was a primary
reason for their failure.57 During 1929-32, the percentage losses suffered by national and state
member banks on their securities investments exceeded their percentage losses on loans.58
Smaller country banks suffered the greatest percentage losses, because they had generally
invested a larger share of their funds in higher-risk securities. Some commentators blamed
country bankers for their imprudence in pursuing higher yields without regard to risk. However,
members of Congress and other observers condemned securities firms and securities affiliates of
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banks for encouraging unsophisticated country bankers to buy high-risk securities.59
Securities affiliates of banks did not escape the carnage. For example, the affiliates of
NCB and Chase produced major losses for themselves and their sister banks. After making
profits of $25 million during 1925-29, NCC incurred net losses of more than $100 million during
1930-33, including heavy losses on its equity investments. For its part, NCB held (i) $80 million
of frozen “bridge loans” extended to NCC’s customers in expectation of bond offerings that were
never completed, and (ii) several million dollars of unpaid loans obtained by NCB’s officers for
the purpose of buying NCB’s stock. NCB recorded total losses of $170 million during 1930-34,
amounting to two-thirds of its shareholders’ equity at the end of 1929.60
Similarly, CSC wrote down its capital by $80 million during 1930-33, reflecting heavy
losses on its equity investments. Chase’s losses for 1930-34 exceeded $130 million, reducing its
book value per share by 54% since the end of 1929. More than half of Chase’s losses resulted
from (i) loans made to the Republic of Cuba to support of CSC’s Cuban underwriting activities,
and (ii) loans and equity investments supporting General Theatres Equipment, a bankrupt
company that had been a major client of CSC. The boards of directors of NCB and Chase
dismissed the executives (Charles Mitchell and Albert Wiggin) who had led the banks into the
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securities business, and both banks liquidated their securities affiliates in 1934. NCB and Chase
survived the Great Depression, even though they suffered tremendous reputational damage and
their stock prices declined more than most of their peer institutions.61 As discussed in the next
section, many of their regional competitors did not fare so well.
3.

Major bank failures related to real estate and securities activities.

A comprehensive discussion of bank failures during the 1930's is beyond the scope of this
article. However, the following failures or near-failures of major banking organizations can be
tied to their heavy involvement in the real estate and/or securities markets:
•

Caldwell and Co. (“CAC”) established a large financial and industrial empire that

included (i) a securities firm that underwrote municipal bonds, real estate bonds and industrial
revenue bonds throughout the South, (ii) the largest chain of banks and the largest insurance
group in the South, with combined assets of nearly $450 million, and (iii) newspapers and
industrial companies. In early 1930, CAC merged with BancoKentucky Co., which controlled a
chain of banks with total assets of $130 million. The entire structure was financially unsound
and collapsed in November 1930. CAC’s demise precipitated the failures of more than 130
banks and inflicted a severe economic shock on several Southern states (including Arkansas,
Kentucky, North Carolina and Tennessee).62
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•

Bank of United States (“BUS”), a large New York City bank with over $200

million of assets, failed in December 1930. BUS expanded rapidly during the 1920's by
purchasing five other banks, and it also established a large network of real estate and securities
affiliates. BUS and its real estate affiliates made large loans to real estate developers and
invested in real estate bonds. BUS also made substantial loans to its officers and securities
affiliates to finance trading in BUS’ stock. BUS was determined to support its stock price
because of price guarantees it had issued to many shareholders. BUS failed when the real estate
and stock markets slumped in 1930. While there has been scholarly debate over the
macroeconomic effects of BUS’ failure, BUS’ demise probably had a significant adverse impact
on public confidence in banks. A small New York bank and a medium-sized Philadelphia bank
failed shortly thereafter, and the New York Clearing House was forced to defend Manufacturers
Trust against a potential depositor run.63
•

In 1931 banking panics occurred in Chicago, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia and

several cities in the Cleveland district (including Akron, Toledo and Youngstown). Most of
these failures occurred because of the banks’ heavy exposure to defaulted real estate loans and
depreciated real estate bonds. Each panic was brought to an end by collective action (including
forced mergers) organized by the leading banks in each community. For example, the First
National Bank of Chicago acquired Foreman State Bank and two other threatened Chicago banks
were merged together to form Central Republic Bank. Similarly, the New York Clearing House
63
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helped Manufacturers Trust to acquire the Chatham Phenix Bank and several smaller New York
City banks.64
•

In 1932, a full-scale banking panic broke out in Chicago. Central Republic Bank

was faced with imminent failure after the Insull utility empire collapsed, because half of
Central’s capital was tied up in loans that were collateralized by Insull securities. Central’s
problems threatened the city’s two largest banks – Continental Illinois and First National –
because they had also made extensive loans secured by Insull interests and their securities
affiliates had underwritten Insull debentures. Chicago banks also confronted severe real estate
lending problems, as $1 billion of Chicago property was already in foreclosure. The
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (“RFC”) made an emergency loan of $90 million to Central,
which enabled Central to transfer its deposits and offices to a newly-chartered bank and liquidate
its remaining assets in an orderly manner. The RFC’s action effectively protected Central’s
depositors and thereby forestalled a likely depositor run on the other big Chicago banks.
Similarly, the RFC headed off a threat to Bank of America, the largest bank in California, which
was heavily burdened with nonperforming real estate loans. The RFC boosted Bank of
America’s liquidity by lending $90 million to the bank and its affiliated mortgage company.65
•

A nationwide banking panic was triggered by the failure of Detroit’s two largest
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bank holding companies in February 1933. Detroit Bankers Corp. (“DBC”) and Guardian
Detroit Union Group (“Guardian”) controlled four-fifths of the Detroit area’s banking assets.
DBC and Guardian grew rapidly by acquiring numerous banks during the 1920's, and both
companies had active securities affiliates. Both companies and their banks had heavy
concentrations in real estate loans, real estate bonds and loans secured by their own stock. The
severe slump in the automotive industry after 1929 devastated the Detroit economy and exposed
both organizations to severe losses. The RFC tried to rescue Guardian and DBC, but its lending
capacity was limited by its statutory mandate to obtain good collateral for its loans. Henry Ford
refused to provide financial support for Guardian, and he threatened to pull his deposits out of
DBC. Federal and state authorities therefore closed all of DBC’s and Guardian’s banks, and the
Michigan governor declared a statewide bank holiday. The Michigan disaster rapidly spread to
other states. For example, the two largest banks in Cleveland collapsed shortly after the
Michigan debacle, due largely to their heavy exposure to failed corporate and real estate ventures
promoted by the Eaton and Van Sweringen interests. By early March, nearly every state had
imposed a general moratorium or other restrictions on deposit withdrawals. Upon his inaugural,
President Franklin Roosevelt declared a nationwide bank holiday.66
The foregoing bank failures had a severe macroeconomic impact in two respects. First,
bank failures had adverse monetary effects because (i) depositors increasingly converted their
deposits into currency as major bank failures multiplied after 1930, and (ii) about $7 billion of
bank deposits were frozen in closed or suspended banks by 1933. Commercial bank deposits
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declined by over 42%, of $18 billion, during 1929-33, which depressed the nation’s money
supply. 67 Second, bank failures also had serious nonmonetary effects, because they (1) disrupted
lender-borrower relationships, (2) discouraged surviving banks from extending loans to smaller
firms, which faced much greater risks to their viability in comparison with large corporations,
and (3) encouraged banks and other institutional investors to invest only in U.S. government
bonds and the securities of the largest and safest corporations. In short, banks sought to survive
the Great Depression by shifting from loans to safe government securities, bond spreads between
highly-rated firms and lower-rated firms grew to unprecedented levels and smaller firms were
essentially shut out of the credit markets.68
It is noteworthy that thousands of small rural banks had failed during the 1920's
(primarily due to the severe slump in agricultural markets after World War I), but those failures
did not have a material impact on the national economy. Most studies have found that severe
monetary effects (including currency hoarding) and nonmonetary effects (including widespread
business failures) began with the failures of large banks that commenced in late 1930 and
continued through the bank holiday of 1933 and the long resolution process that followed.69 For
a variety of reasons, the FRB failed to act effectively as lender of last resort to the banking
system in the early 1930's. By 1933, collective action by banks and loans by the RFC could no
67
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longer prevent a nationwide banking crisis. The federal government restored the banking system
and depositor confidence only by (i) recapitalizing banks with RFC purchases of preferred stock
and (ii) instituting a national deposit insurance scheme.70

Conclusion
International banking crises since the 1970's and the U.S. experience during the Great
Depression share a number of common elements. Financial deregulation typically encourages
banks to expand their involvement in the securities and real estate markets, and it also intensifies
competition between banks and nonbank financial intermediaries. As a result, financial
liberalization tends to increase the vulnerability of the banking system to sudden collapses of
asset values in the securities and real estate markets. For these reasons, deregulation has been
associated with boom-and-bust cycles and banking crises in many countries since the 1970's, and
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the same was true of the United States during the Great Depression.
Systemic bank crises have serious monetary and nonmonetary impacts on the general
economy that are difficult and expensive to overcome. While government officials often
proclaim their adherence to “market discipline” before a banking crisis occurs, the experiences of
the Great Depression and more recent years have convinced most authorities that systemic
banking crises cannot be left to run their course. The conventional response since the 1970's has
been to take the same course which U.S. authorities adopted in 1933 – namely, to recapitalize
large banks and protect depositors against loss. Given the virtual certainty of massive
governmental intervention when systemic banking crises occur, regulators must give greater
attention to the potential long-term economic risks of financial liberalization programs.
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